When satellite data becomes a weapon

Iran last month The Tehran Times published what appeared to be damning satellite evidence: a before-and-after photo of the “US radar,” which was supposedly “completely destroyed.”

It wasn’t. The image was a year-old Google Earth AI-manipulated version taken from Bahrain – wrong location, wrong timeline, fabricated damage. Open source intelligence researchers He exposed it within hours They matched old satellite images and identified identical visual artifacts, right down to cars frozen in the same positions.

A small act of disinformation, quickly debunked. But she pointed out a challenge that becomes more difficult during active conflict: The satellite infrastructure that journalists, analysts, pilots and governments rely on to clearly see the conflict in the Gulf has itself become contested territory — delayed, spoofed, blocked or simply controlled by actors whose interests do not always align with public access.

This escalation comes in the wake of escalating tensions between the United States, Israel and Iran, with missile and drone activity bringing Gulf airspace and regional infrastructure – including satellites and navigation systems – into the conflict.

Infrastructure is no longer neutral

When satellite data becomes unreliable, controlling it becomes a central issue.

In the Gulf region, satellite infrastructure is largely managed by state-backed operators. These satellites rely on geostationary satellites, located at high altitudes above the equator, which are used for activities such as broadcasting, communications, and weather forecasting.

In the UAE, this includes secure communications and Earth observation company Space42. The Saudi-led Arabsat handles broadcast and broadband, while Qatar’s Es’hailSat satellite supports regional connectivity. They all operate under close government supervision.

Iran is building a parallel regime. Its satellites, including Paya (also known as Tulu-3), are part of… A broader push for expansion Surveillance capabilities independent of Western infrastructure. A high-resolution Earth observation satellite was launched from Russia’s Vostochny Cosmodrome.

The market around that infrastructure is growing rapidly. The satellite communications sector in the Middle East is It is valued at more than $4 billion and is expected to reach $5.64 billion by 2031, according to one estimate, driven largely by air connectivity associated with both commercial aviation and defense demand. Offshore platforms already account for nearly a third of regional revenues.

Access is the new bottleneck

Commercial low-Earth orbit fleets, such as Planet Labs and Maxar, operate differently from government-owned systems, and access is the main hurdle. Governments receive priority tasks, while newsrooms and NGOs rely on paid subscriptions.

On March 11, Planet Labs announced that it would extend its Middle East filming delay by two weeks. the The company denied the decision This was at the request of any government, stating instead that the aim was to “ensure that our images are not tactically exploited by hostile actors to target personnel and civilians of NATO allies and partners.”

“Losing Planet Labs was very tough because we were getting a fast update rate,” Maryam Ishani Thompson, an open source intelligence (OSINT) correspondent, told WIRED Middle East. “We were getting a fast update rate. Even if we turned to Chinese satellites, we were not getting that speed.”

Chinese platforms such as MizarVision, a Shanghai-based open source geospatial information provider, have seen increased usage since the delay, part of a broader shift in who controls the flow of images. Russia and China are also increasingly sharing access to satellites with Iran, meaning the companies that used to set the terms of what the world can see are no longer the only ones eyeing the Gulf.

If you can’t verify, you can’t challenge the narrative

In practice, the consequences are immediate.

Ishani’s verification process is based on historical reference points. The still nature of the image published by the Tehran Times – with cars in identical positions in both frames – was detectable precisely because the journalists had recent photographs to compare it to. Remove that baseline, and it becomes difficult to expose the same image.

“In that dark space,” says Ishani. He added: “Iran is producing its false narrative. If we cannot document it and verify its authenticity, they can continue to create the narrative and sell it to their people.”

For most commercial or privately owned satellite companies, the U.S. government is one of their largest customers — which creates a “reluctance to bother the U.S. government,” says Victoria Sampson, senior director for space security and stability at the nonprofit Secure World Foundation.